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ABSTRACT
This Article compares the European and United States stances regarding
the right to be forgotten. Within that context, this Article explores the
implications of technological advances on constitutional rights, specifically
the intersection of the right to free speech and the right to privacy,
commonly referred to as the "right to be forgotten" paradox. In the United
States, the trend is to favor free speech, while Europe places an emphasis
on human rights. Each approach is analyzed based on supporting case law.
The consequences of each approach on society, both long- and short-term,
are also discussed. This Article argues that a right to be forgotten is
incompatible with American First Amendment jurisprudence and that
online privacy and reputation management are best handled by the private
sector as our culture continues to evolve with technology.
I. INTRODUCTION
Technology has infiltrated the everyday lives of most people living in the
United States and Europe. The Internet in particular, has created a
widespread ability to immediately access and transmit information on a
global platform. This ability, while arguably the most beneficial
technological advancement in human history, has carried with it several-
perhaps unanticipated-societal consequences. The U.S. legal system and
its fundamental principles have been challenged in many ways by the
adoption of the Internet and modern technological advances.' The topic
of this Article, the so-called "Right to Be Forgotten" Doctrine,2 evidences
1. For example, the Communications Decency Act of 1996 addresses liability for defamatory
statements posted on the web or transmitted via the Internet. 47 U.S.C. 5 230 (2012). See also VINCENT
R_ JOHNSON, ADVANCED TORT LAW: A PROBLEM APPROACH 266-74 (2d ed. 2014) (discussing
liability for defamation in the U.S. under the Communications Decency Act).
2. See, e.g., Marcelo Thompson, Beyond Gatekeeping: The Normative Responsibi'io of Internet
Intermediaries, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 783, 809 (2016) ("T]he Court of Justice of the European
Union adopted what would become known, albeit hyperbolically, as the right to be forgotten. In Google
Spain SI the court recognized the right of individuals to have data about them removed from search
engine results whenever such data is processed in incompatibility with provisions of the Data
Protection Directive.") (citation omitted). "The [Data Protection] Directive is due to be replaced by a
directly effective E.U. Regulation. When this occurs,... [the Data Protection Act of 1998] will be
repealed or significantly amended." BRIAN NEILL ET AL., DUNCAN AND NEILL ON DEFAMATION
327 (4th ed. 2015).
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one of these impediments, which courts have been increasingly forced to
consider since the creation of the Internet. The controversy encompassing
the right to be forgotten is found at the intersection between freedom of
speech and the right to privacy. A person within a jurisdiction that has
adopted the right to be forgotten is afforded an avenue to remove unwanted
personal information from the Internet, often regardless of whether that
person published the information in the first place. By doing so, that
person's privacy rights are protected. Conversely, in a jurisdiction that does
not recognize the right to be forgotten, a person has far less ability to
remove truthful information published by another party; the other party's
right to speak freely is protected. In other words, the right to be forgotten
weighs the utility of allowing full access to uncensored information against
the utility of protecting a person's image and well-being by allowing post-
hoc censorship of information detrimental to that person.3 This balancing
process is normally fact-intensive.4 On an international level, the balance
between the rights to freedom of speech and privacy is unsettled with
respect to the right to be forgotten. The right to be forgotten has garnered
heated debate, with feverous supporting and opposing parties on each side.
This debate has culminated into two opposing views between the United
States and Europe, which have taken polar stances on whether to recognize
a legal right to be forgotten. The U.S. approach tends to favor free speech
over the right to privacy by refusing to recognize a constitutional right to be
forgotten.' On the other hand, European courts have expressly created a
right to be forgotten, ruling in favor of content removal in certain contexts.
II. THE EUROPEAN APPROACH
The European approach to the right to be forgotten favors individual
privacy at the expense of free expression, and the European Union (E.U.)
expressly recognizes the doctrine as law.6 Through the doctrine, individuals
3. See id. at 338 (discussing balancing under the Google Spain decision).
4. See MULLIS ET AL., GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER 855-65 (12th ed. 2013) (explaining how
the "ultimate balancing test" is applied in England).
5. The U.S. approach is consistent with the small number of American decisions that have refused
to impose liability for invasion of privacy based on public disclosure of truthful information. See Doe
v. Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681, 693 (Ind. 1997) (declining to recognize disclosure actions and
noting that "torts involving disclosure of truthful but private facts ... [encounter] a considerable
obstacle in the truth-in-defense provisions of the Indiana Constitution."); see also Hall v. Post, 372
S.E.2d 711, 717 (N.C. 1988) (declining to recognize tort liability for private disclosure of private facts
because of its potential for conflict with the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution).
6. See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espafiola de Protecci6n de Datos (AEPD),
2014 E.C.R. 1-317, IM 54-55, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jstext
= &
docid= 152065&doclang=EN (affirming a right to be forgotten for citizens of the European Union).
2016]
3
Royston: The Right to Be Forgotten
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2017
ST. MARY'S LA WJOURNAL
in the E.U. are better able to control personal content on the Internet by
making requests to search engines like Google that certain content be de-
linked and no longer searchable.7 Search engines are required to accept de-
linking requests from individuals, review them, and decide whether the
request satisfies government-established guidelines.8  While those
companies are often compelled to de-link information, they retain some
discretion when determining what must be removed.9
A. Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espafiola de Protecci6n de Datos1 °
The landmark European case, which introduced the right to be forgotten
into E.U. law, began after a Spanish man, Mario Costeja Gonzklez,
requested Google to remove personal information from its web search
engine. Mr. Costeja Gonzilez wanted Google to de-link online newspaper
articles that reported his house was under foreclosure because he had missed
two social security tax payments more than a decade earlier.11 He filed a
complaint with Spain's data-protection agency, the Agencia Espafiola de
Protecci6n de Datos (AEPD), against the newspaper and Google, arguing
that the online articles were outdated and irrelevant because the tax issues
had been resolved years prior, and he was able to keep his home.12 The
AEPD dismissed the complaint against the newspaper, but the Google
complaint proceeded.1 3 After upholding Mr. Costeja Gonzalez's complaint
7. See id. at 98-99 (discussing how the data subject is entitled to have information linked to his
name removed from Google and explaining "those rights override ... the interest of the general public
in having access to that information").
8. See Farhad Manjoo, 'Right to Be Forgotten' Online Could Spread, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2015),
http://nyti.ms/lSOOBmk (describing the process by which Europeans who feel they are being
misrepresented by irrelevant or inaccurate search results can request search engines de-link the
material).
9. See Recent Case--Court ofJustice of the European Union Creates Presumption that Google Must Remove
Links to Personal Data upon Request--Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agenda Espafiola de
Protecci6n de Datos (May 13, 2014), 128 HARV. L. REV. 735, 737-38 (2014) ("[qritics argue these
requests should not be considered or decided upon entirely inside a private corporation, without public
accountability or scrutiny."); Danny O'Brien & Jiflian York, Rights that Are Being Forgotten: Google, the
ECJ, and Free Expression, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (July 8, 2014),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/07/rights-are-being-forgotten-google-ecj- and-free-expression
(discussing the risks inherent to companies like Google and Facebook becoming the frontline of
content regulation and advocating that content restrictions should be determined by the courts rather
than through an online form transmitted to a private company).
10. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SLv. Agencia Espafiola de Protecci6n de Datos (AEPD), 2014
E.C.R. 1-317, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsp. text=&docid=52065&
doclang=EN.
11. Id. at 14-15.
12. Id. at 15.
13. See id. at 16-17 ("Tlhe AEPD rejected the complaint in so far as it related to La
[Vol. 48:253
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against Google and ordering Google to remove Mr. Costeja Gonzalez's
personal data from its search index, a request for preliminary rulings was
submitted to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).
14 The
high court's request sought the CJEU's interpretation of Directive
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October
1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of
personal data and on the free movement of such data, (the Directive), as
well as Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union.15 Three questions were posed: (1) whether Directive 95/46 applies
to companies operating outside the E.U.; (2) whether search engines are
data "controllers" and thus subject to Directive 95/46; and (3) whether and
under what circumstances citizens have the right to exercise the right to be
forgotten. 
1 6
The CJEU first considered whether search engines such as Google are
processors of personal data and must be regarded as data controllers within
the meaning of Article 2 of Directive 95/46.17 Google Spain and Google,
Inc. argued that search engines do not process data that appear on third
parties' websites and which are displayed in a list of search results but rather
"collect information available on the Mnternet without effecting a selection
between personal data and other information."18 Further, Google asserted
that even if their search engines were to be considered "data processers,"
the company operating the search engine could not be said to be a "data
controller" since the company had no knowledge of the data that appeared
on extraneous websites, nor does the company operating the search engine
Vanguardia, taking the view that the publication by it of the information in question was legally justified
as it took place upon order of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and was intended to give
maximum publicity to the auction in order to secure as many bidders as possible.").
14. Id. at 17.
15. Id. at 1. Directive 95/46 is aimed at protecting individuals' fundamental rights and
freedoms, especially with regard to the right to privacy and the processing and free flow of personal
data. Id. at 3; see also Council Directive 95/46, art. 2(a), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 38 (EC) ("[D]ata-
processing systems are designed to serve man ... [and] they must, whatever the nationality or residence
of natural persons, respect their fundamental rights and freedoms, notably the right to privacy... and
the well-being of individuals.').
16. Googk Spain SL, Case C-131/12 at 20.
17. Id. at IM 21-41. Directive 95/46 defines "processing of personal data" or "processing" as
"any operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by
automatic means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval,
consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment
or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction." Council Directive 95/46, art. 2(b), 1995 O.J. (L
281) 31, 38 (EC). The Directive defines "controller" as "the natural or legal person, public authority,
agency or any other body which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the
processing of personal data". Id. art. 2(c).
18. Google Spain SL, Case C-131/12 at 22.
2016]
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exercise any control over the data.1 9 The court found that:
[I]n exploring the [iMnternet automatically, constantly and systematically in
search of the information which is published there, the operator of a search
engine "collects" such data which it subsequently "retrieves", "records" and
"organises" within the framework of its indexing programmes, "stores" on its
servers and, as the case may be, "discloses" and "makes available" to its users
in the form of lists of search results.
20
Thus, the court determined the Google search engines must be regarded
as processing personal data within the meaning of Directive 95/46
Article 2(b).2 ' The court further reasoned that "the search engine operator
determines the purposes and means of' the processing of personal data
and, therefore, must be considered a "controller" under the Directive.2 2
The CJEU next considered whether the Directive applied to Google even
though Google performed data processing outside of the country in which
the complaint was filed.23  The court held Google was subject to the
Directive because Google, Inc. established a subsidiary, Google Spain,
which promoted and sold advertising space in Spain and directed those
activities towards inhabitants of Spain.2 4
Finally, the CJEU reached the ultimate questions-whether Mr.
Gonzilez and other E.U. citizens may exercise a right to be forgotten, and
19. Id.
20. Id. at 28.
21. The court held the Google search engines are data processors within the meaning set forth
in Directive 95/46, despite the fact that the search engine does not publish or alter the data and also
collects, retrieves, and organizes other types of information without distinguishing such information
from personal data. Id. at 28-29.
22. Id. at 33. The court equated search engine operators with controllers by discussing the role
of the search engine in the greater distribution and accessibility of information that would not have
otherwise been found on the web page where such information was published without a user searching
for it through the search engine. Id. at 36.
23. Id. at 77 42-45. "Specifically, the main issues raised by the referring court concern the notion
of 'establishment', within the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) of Directive 95/46, and of 'use of equipment
situated on the territory of the said Member State', within the meaning of Article 4(1)(c)." Id. at T 44.
24. See id. at 45-60 (observing how "Google Spain engages in the effective and real exercise
of activity through stable arrangements in Spain" and is a separate legal entity from Google, Inc. on
Spanish territory, thus making Google Spain an establishment of Google Inc. under Article 4(1)(a) of
the Directive); see also Court ofJustice of the European Union Creates Presumption that Google Must Remove Links
to Personal Data upon Request-Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espafiola de Protecci6n de
Datos, supra note 9, 737-38 ("Though all of Google Inc.'s data processing occurred outside Spain,
Google Spain sold advertising space within the country; since advertising is Google Inc.'s main source
of revenue, the court held that the two entities were 'closely linked.' Google Spain was thus effectively
an establishment of Google Inc., making Google Inc. subject to the Directive." (citing Google Spain ST,
Case C-131/12 at 44, 60)).
[-Vol. 48:253
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consequently whether search engines like Google must remove personal
information in accordance with requests from individuals.25 The court
discussed Article 12 of the Directive, which states: "Member States are to
guarantee every data subject the right to obtain from the controller, as
appropriate, the rectification, erasure or blocking of data the processing of
which does not comply with the provisions of Directive 95/46, in particular
because of the incomplete or inaccurate nature of the data.",2
6 Then, the
court discussed Article 7's test for appropriateness of processing personal
data:
[Article 7] permits the processing of personal data where it is necessary for
the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller... except
where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and
freedoms of the data subject-in particular his right to privacy with respect
to the processing of personal data-which require protection under ... the
[D]irective.
27
Finally, the court held that the Directive established the right to be
forgotten.28  According to the CJEU, when a data subject, such as Mr.
GonzAlez, takes issue with personal data, the data subject can make a request
under Article 12(b) directly to the data controller (e.g., Google).
2 9 The data
controller must then examine the request and, if meritorious, honor the
request and end processing of the data in question. As for Mr. Gonzalez's
requests to have his personal data removed by Google, the CJEU noted that
the Directive called for a balancing test to determine whether the
controller's legitimate interests were "overridden by the interests or
25. Google Spain SL, Case C-131/12 at 62.
26. Id. at 70.
27. Id. at 74.
28. The phrase "the right to be forgotten" appears twice in the CJEU's opinion-first in quoted
language from the AEPD's pleadings and second in paragraph 91, where it states that the fundamental
rights to protect personal data and to privacy comprise the right to be forgotten. Id at I 20, 91 ("]he
data subject may oppose the indexing by a search engine of personal data relating to him where their
dissemination through the search engine is prejudicial to him and his fundamental rights to the
protection of those data and to privacy-which encompass the 'right to be forgotten' ..... ). However,
the phrase has become synonymous with an individual's right to protect his or her personal data online.
29. Id. at T 94 ("Therefore, if it is found, following a request by the data subject pursuant to
Article 12(b) of Directive 95/46, that the inclusion in the list of results displayed following a search
made on the basis of his name of the links to web pages published lawfully by third parties and
containing true information relating to him personally is, at this point in time, incompatible with
Article 6(1)(c) to (e) of the directive because that information appears, having regard to all the
circumstances of the case, to be inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to
the purposes of the processing at issue carried out by the operator of the search engine, the information
and links concerned in the list of results must be erased.").
2016]
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fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject-in particular his right
to privacy."3 Although the processing of some personal data is permitted
when the controller's legitimate interests require it, the controller's
economic interests are not enough to overcome the interference with the
data subject's privacy rights.3 1 In fact, the CJEU went as far as to state that
"as a rule," the data subject's right to have information relating to him or
her personally no longer linked to a list of search results based on his or her
name overrides a search engine operator's economic interest and "the
interest of the general public in having access to that information upon a
search relating to the data subject's name."32 Moreover, the court held it
was not necessary that the information in question be proved prejudicial
against the data subject before his or her rights to have it removed from
search results would outweigh the search engine operator's rights as a
controller.33 The CJEU concluded there was no public need for the
information at issue in Mr. Gonzalez's case and no reason to deny Mr.
Gonzalez's removal request.34 The public utility for the information was
outweighed by the detriment to the individual.3" Several critics of the
ruling, both American and European, have taken the stance that this
precedent shifts too much power to the individual.36
B. Crifical Reviews of Google Spain SL v. AEPD
Critics from countries across the world have expressed numerous
concerns regarding the CJEU's holding in Google Spain SL v. Agenia Efpaola
de Protecddn de Datos and the right to be forgotten. At the outset, critics argue
the evaluation criteria-"inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or
excessive in relation to [the] purposes [of the processing] and in the light of
the time that has elapsed"-gives far too much power to the individual and
30. Id. at 74; see also Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 8, 2000 O.J.
(C 364) 1 (setting forth the right to protection of personal data).
31. GoogleSpainSLCaseC-131/12at 81.
32. Id. at 99.
33. Id. at 99. But see id. ('However, that would not be the case if it appeared, for particular
reasons, such as the role played by the data subject in public life, that the interference with his
fundamental tights is justified by the preponderant interest of the general public in having, on account
of its inclusion in the list of results, access to the information in question.").
34. Id. at 98.
35. Id. at 98 (finding no substantial interest for the public in having Mr. Gonzilez's
information).
36. See Court of Justice of the European Union Creates Presumtion that Google Must Remove Links to
Personal Data upon Request-Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espahiola de Protecci6n de
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offers insufficient credit to the basic fundamental rights of others, including
freedom of expression and the right to information.37 This unbalanced
balancing test creates a presumption of erasure. Moreover, search engines,
such as Google, become the gatekeepers to the proverbial erase button,
removing links and data from the Internet at the request of individuals who
prefer that information not be easily accessible. Google has already been
forced to process hundreds of thousands of individual erasure requests,
38
and there is little incentive for them to thoroughly investigate those
requests.39 Instead, to avoid litigation or negative publicity relating to any
request for removal, companies will likely honor most requests without
conducting any meaningful investigations of the requests' merits.' Thus,
while the Directive and the court's interpretation of the Directive go to great
lengths to protect individuals' right to privacy, they fail to give any credence
to freedom of expression and the free flow of information.41
Another line of criticism of the CJEU's opinion in the Google Spain case
asserts that the court's interpretation of "data controllers" is overly broad
and a proper interpretation of data controllers should not include search
engine operators. A report by the British House of Lords analyzing the
CJEU's decision stated that, by the court's logic, a search-engine user would
be a data controller within the meaning of Directive 95/46;42 thus, every
37. Id. (quoting Google Spain SL, Case C-131/12 at 93); see also id. at 739-40 ("By focusing so
much on the right to privacy, the CJEU 'forgot that other rights were also applicable,' including
freedom of information." (foomote omitted) (citing Steve Peers, The CJEUs Google Spain Judgment:
Failing to Balance Privacy and Freedom of Expression, E.U. L. ANALYSIS (May 13, 2014),
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2014/05/the-cjeus-google-spain-judgment-faiihng.html)).
38. See Sylvia Tippmann & Julie Powles, Google Acdidentally Reveals Data on 'Right to Be Forgotten'
Requests, GUARDIAN (July 14, 2015, 9:28), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/14/
google-accidentally-reveals-right-to-be-forgotten-requests (stating the number of removal requests
received by Google between May 2014 and July 2015 exceeded 280,000).
39. See Jeff John Roberts, The Right to Be Forgotten from Google? Forget It, Says U.S. Crowd, FORTUNE
(Mar. 12, 2015, 11:32 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/03/12/the-right-to-be-forgotten-from-google-
forget-it-says-u-s-crowd (discussing the decision search engines like Google will have to make between
granting the request or "risking an expensive legal headache").
40. Cf O'Brien & York, supra note 9 (discussing the risks inherent to companies like Google and
Facebook becoming the frontline of content regulation).
41. See EU Court Enshrines 'Rght to Be Forgotten" in Spanish Case Against Google, REPORTERS
WITHOUT BORDERS (May 14, 2014), http://en.rsf.org/union-europeetne-eu-court-enshrines-right-
to-be-14-05-2014,46278.hml (interpreting the ruling in Google Spain as holding privacy rights superior
to the freedom of information).
42. See EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, EU DATA PROTECTION LAW: A 'RIGHT TO BE
FORGOTTEN'?, 2014-2015, HL 40, 41 (U.K.) [hereinafter HL COMMITTEE REPORT] ("If search
engines are data controllers, so logically are users of search engines."); see also O'Brien & York, supra
note 9 ("Restrictions on free expression need to be considered, in public, by the courts, on a case-by-
case basis, and with both publishers and plaintiffs represented, not via an online form. .. ').
2016]
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time an individual runs a Google search, they could become subject to the
directive as a controller of the personal data of another.
Supporters of the court's opinion argue that critics have skewed the
court's viewpoints and fail to see the opportunity the court provided to
address the right to be forgotten with adequate regulatory standards.
"Critics seeking meaningful change should instead use the decision and the
ensuing debate to shape the conversation on a new regulatory regime
tailored to the nuances of modern privacy protection and reflective of the
values these critics seem to believe are currently underrepresented."4 3
C. The Max Moslfy Cases
Another case at the forefront of Europe's implementation of the right to
be forgotten involves Max Mosley, former racecar driver and former
President of the F~dration Internationale de l'Automobile (the governing
body for Formula One racing).4 4 An undercover journalist for news-outlet
News of the World used a hidden camera to videotape Mr. Mosley allegedly
engaging in a Nazi-themed group sex party with several women, supposedly
prostitutes.45 Mr. Mosley sued the newspaper for breach of confidence and
the unauthorized disclosure of personal information after it published an
article and photographs.46 Mr. Mosley was awarded £60,000, but the court
refused to grant an injunction ordering removal of the video, holding that
because the video was so widely available, ordering the News of the World to
remove it would serve no purpose.4 7  Despite the court's holding in Mr.
43. Court of Justice of the European Union Creates Presumption that Google Must Remove Links to Personal
Data upon Request-Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espafiola de Protecci6n de Datos (May
13, 2014), supra note 9 at 737-38; see also id. ("The real debate is not on what has already been decided,
but on what is yet to come; if critics hope to change the substantive outcome, they must shift their
focus from secondary legal and policy arguments to the fundamental values at stake.').
44. Ulike Dauer & Lisa Fleisher, Former Formula One Chief Max Mosly Settles Legal Dipute with
Google: Harbinger of Battles to Come in Europe's Developing 'Right to Be Forgotten,'WALL ST. J. (May 15, 2015,
2:38 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/former-formula-one-chief-max-mosley-settdes-legal-dispute-
with-google-1431702038.
45. See Leigh Holmwood & Caitlin Fitzsimmons, Max Moslfy Wins C60,000 in Privacy Case,
GUARDIAN (uly 24, 2008, 06.42), http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/jul/24/mosley.privacy
(expressing the news outlet had an informant on Mosley's sex session).
46. See Mosley v. News Grp. Newspapers Ltd. [2008] EWHC (QB) 1777 [3] (Eng.) ("The cause
of action is breach of confidence and/ or the unauthorized disclosure of personal information, said to
infringe the Claimant's rights of privacy."); Holmwood & Fitzsimmons, supra note 45 (discussing
Mosley's suit against the "paper for grossly invading his privacy after it printed pictures and published
video of him indulging in a five-hour sadomasochistic sex session").
47. Mosley v. United Kingdom, App. No. 48009/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 28 (2011); John Oates,
Max Mosley Loses Battle to Get Sex Video Off Web: NoTW Reposts 'Orgy' Footage, REGISTER (Apr. 9, 2008,
14:12), http://www.theregister.co.uk/ 2008/04/09/formula one boss.
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Mosley's case against the newspaper, Mr. Mosley continued to pursue
injunctive relief by filing complaints against Google in Germany, France,
and the United Kingdom.4" Mr. Mosley prevailed at the trial court level in
Germany and France, and the U.K. High Court of Justice permitted Mr.
Mosley's case to proceed to trial; however, the parties reached a settlement
agreement before the U.K. Court or the German and French appellate
courts rendered opinions." Some commentators have suggested that, had
the various courts issued opinions, the right to be forgotten and the CJEU's
ruling in the Google Spain case would not have applied to Mr. Mosley's case
because of his status as a public figure.
50
Apart from Mr. Mosley's cases against Google, Mr. Mosley sought relief
from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).51 Mr. Mosley argued
that U.K. law should provide an opportunity for courts to issue pre-
publication injunctions against news articles such as the article at issue in
Mr. Mosley's case. 2 The basis for his complaint was that the United
Kingdom failed to protect his rights under Article 8 of the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.5 3  He
reasoned that "it was for the courts and not the newspapers" to balance "the
right to freedom of expression [with] the right to respect for private life." 54
While the ECHR criticized the newspaper's conduct, it refused to recognize
a pre-notification requirement:
Mhe Court has consistently emphasised the need to look beyond the facts of
the present case and to consider the broader impact of a pre-notification
requirement.... [H]aving regard to the chilling effect to which a pre-
notification requirement risks giving rise, to the significant doubts as to the
effectiveness of any pre-notification requirement and to the wide margin of
appreciation in this area, the Court is of the view that Article 8 does not
48. See Dauer & Fleisher, supra note 44 ("Mr. Mosley also won legal battles against Google in
Paris and in Hamburg, Germany .... In January, the U.K. High Court of Justice allowed Mr. Mosley's
claim to proceed to trial.. .
49. Id.
50. See id (explaining the balance that should occur between the right to privacy and the public's
tight to know).
51. Mosley v. United Kingdom, App. No. 48009/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011).
52. Id. at 79-80.
53. See id. at 66 (2011) (quoting Art. 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms) ("1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life ....
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this ight except such as is
in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security,
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.'D.
54. Id. at 80.
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require a legally binding pre-notification requirement. Accordingly, the Court
concludes that there has been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention by
the absence of such a requirement in domestic law.
5
5
The ECHR also warned that instituting a pre-notification requirement
before a newspaper or other media outlet publishes information about an
individual would run the risk of violating Article 10-Freedom of
Expression.
5 6
III. THE U.S. APPROACH
The doctrine of the right to be forgotten has been flatly rejected in U.S.
courts, which favor free speech over privacy.5" The United States'
deference to the right to free speech is derived from the constitutional
principles protecting the right to openly and freely obtain and transmit
information.5 8 In favoring free speech over privacy rights within the right-
to-be-forgotten context, the American legal system does not altogether
ignore the importance of protecting a person's privacy. American courts
have almost uniformly adopted the approach taken in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts which establishes a cause of action based on four distinct
types of invasion of privacy.5 9 However, U.S. courts have limited the tort
causes of action surrounding privacy and prevented recovery where a
person's past has been opened to the public.60 While U.S. courts have, in
55. Id. at M 130, 132. See also Mark Sweney, Max Mosley Loses European Pivay Case, GUARDIAN
(May 10, 2011, 04.40), http://www.theguardian.com/media/2011/may/10/max-mosley-loses-
european-privacy-case (discussing the ECHR's opinion and the chilling effect that a pre-notification
system would have on the media).
56. Mosly, App. No. 48009/08 at 89.
57. See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 745 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) ("Ultimately, Garcia
would like to have her connection to the film forgotten and stripped from YouTube. Unfortunately
for Garcia, such a 'right to be forgotten,' although recently affirmed by the Court of Justice for the
European Union, is not recognized in the United States.").
58. See id. at 744-45 (citations omitted) (explaining the purpose for including copyright
protections in the U.S. Constitution was to promote and stimulate the free exchange of ideas).
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see also Johnson,
supra note 1, at 346 ("Claims arising from postings on social networking websites or from the contents
of e-mail attachments are routinely scrutinized in terms of the language found in the second
Restatement!). For present purposes, the most relevant privacy action is public disclosure of private
facts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) ("One who gives publicity to a matter
concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if
the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is
not of legitimate concern to the public.').
60. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,283 (1964) (creating the "actual malice" standard
for defamation cases involving public officials); see also Curtis Publ'g Co, v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164
(1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring) (expanding the "actual malice" standard to include public figures).
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some situations, protected a person's private life after it has been published
to the world, courts evenly reject the right to be forgotten in furtherance of
protecting free speech. With some exceptions, rather than silencing speech,
U.S. courts generally respect the principle that once a person or topic is
public knowledge, it remains public knowledge.
A. Early American Right of Privagy Cases
1. Melvin v. Reid 6
The first U.S. case indirectly focusing on the right to be forgotten was
decided in Melvin v. Reid in 1931 by the California Fourth District Court of
Appeals.62 A former prostitute, who was wrongfully accused of murder and
acquitted at trial, adopted a more respectable lifestyle.63 Having exchanged
her life of ill-repute for a respectable life as a homemaker, the last thing she
wanted was an open book into her past transgressions.64  However, she
subsequently became the subject of a movie entitled The Red Kimono, which
was based on her trial.65 It included the former prostitute's name and other
facts pertaining to her former life-all of which were true facts contained
within public court records.66 In response, she filed suit, complaining the
defendants violated her right to privacy.6 ' The court first noted that it could
find no California law creating a tort cause of action for violation of privacy;
however, it rationalized that the California Constitution's guarantees of life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness potentially established a cause of action
for a violation of privacy.68 In holding that the plaintiff had properly alleged
a cause of action arising from the violation of privacy rights, the court
explained that "the right of privacy may be defined as the right to live one's
life in seclusion, without being subjected to unwarranted and undesired
"Public figure" means those persons who are "intimately involved in the resolution of important public
quesnons or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large." Id.
61. Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
62. Seegenerally William L. Prosser, Privay, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 392 (1960) (describing Melvin as
"the leading case").
63. Melin, 297 P. at 91.
64. See id. at 93 (explaining Melvin's life "should have been permitted to continue its course
without having her reputation and social standing destroyed by the publication").
65. Id. at 91.
66. Id. at 91, 93. But see Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975) (holding the First
Amendment prohibits invasion of privacy claims when the information publicly disclosed is public
record).
67. Melvin, 297 P. at 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
68. Id. at 93.
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publicity.... the right to be let alone."69 The court qualified this definition,
stating: "There are times, however, when one, whether willingly or not,
becomes an actor in an occurrence of public or general interest .... [and]
emerges from his seclusion, and it is not an invasion of his right of privacy
to publish his photograph with an account of such occurrence."
7 °
Although the court held that the plaintiff's violation-of-privacy claim was
actionable, it alluded to the fact that public information generally must
remain public:
[T]he use of the incidents from the life of appellant in the moving picture is
in itself not actionable. These incidents appeared in the records of her trial
for murder, which is a public record, open to the perusal of all. The very fact
that they were contained in a public record is sufficient to negative the idea
that their publication was a violation of a right of privacy. When the incidents
of a life are so public as to be spread upon a public record, they come within
the knowledge and into the possession of the public and cease to be private.
7 1
The court's recognition of Plaintiffs claim was grounded in a desire to
protect her identity and former life, which were vital to providing her with
the means of obtaining rehabilitation.72 However, it seems fairly clear that
the court would have hesitated to recognize a claim for injunctive relief.
Any truthful public information about the plaintiff would remain public.
The court did seem to indicate that the plaintiff should be permitted to
escape her former public identity, but it suggests that the defendant would
have been wholly permitted to tell her story if it had not used her true
name.7 3 One principle from Melvin that has been recognized elsewhere is
the possibility that publicizing a person's past crimes infringes on that
person's ability to rehabilitate and, thus, is a violation of the right to
privacy.74  In Briscoe v. Reader's Digest,75 the court held that references to
prior crimes in a widespread publication might infringe on a person's ability
69. Idat 92 (quotingJones v. Herald Post Co., 18 S.W.2d 971, 973 (Ky. 1929)).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 93
72. Id. at 93-94.
73. See id. at 93 ("We believe that the publication by respondents of the unsavory incidents in the
past life of appellant after she had reformed, coupled with her true name, was not justified by any
standard of morals or ethics known to us... .
74. Cf Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34, 40 (Cal. 1971) (recognizing the
rehabilitative policy interests as set out in Melvin), overruled by Gates v. Discovery Commc'ns, Inc., 101
P.3d 552 (Cal. 2004).
75. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971), overruled by Gates v. Discovery
Commc'ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 552 (Cal. 2004).
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to obtain rehabilitation.16 The California Supreme Court did not adopt the
right to be forgotten in Melvin or Briscoe, but the court suggested that public
figures should have some sort of right to fade away from the public eye.7"
At first glance, the court seemed to grasp at establishing a right for criminals
(or former criminals) to be forgotten. It seems paradoxical to give criminals
a right to be forgotten but to decline extending such a right to non-criminals.
But as more recent U.S. case law shows, the Melvin and Briscoe cases are as
close as U.S. courts have come to adopting the right to be forgotten, and
courts generally decline to extend privacy rights to the outer limits of Melvin
and Briscoe.
78
2. Sidis v. F-R Publishing Co0.
7 9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued the
Sidis opinion almost a decade after Melvin, and the court strongly rejected
the Melvin court's suggestion that public figure status should fade with
time.s ° The plaintiff in Sidis had been a "famous child prodigy" three
decades before his lawsuit.8" After graduating from Harvard University at
sixteen years of age, he seemingly disappeared from the public eye.
8 2
Twenty-seven years later, when a New York-based magazine featured Sidis
in its column "Where Are They Now?" and contrasted his early
accomplishments with his ordinary adulthood, Sidis filed suit for invasion
of privacy.83 Rather than continue down the path laid out by Melvin, the
court held against the former child prodigy and refused to recognize a
violation of his right to privacy.84 In part, the court based its holding on
the need to protect freedom of expression, especially when media is
involved:
76. Id. at 43.
77. See id. at 40 ("Where a man has reverted to that 'lawful and unexciting life' led by others, the
Restatement implies that he no longer need 'satisfy the curiosity of the public.").
78. See Jones v. New Haven Register, Inc., 763 A.2d 1097, 1101 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000)
(explaining that when someone becomes a public figure, regardless of whether it is by choice, he
remains a public figure, and is of legitimate public interest for life (quoting Prosser, supra note 62, at
418)).
79. Sids v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cit. 1940).
80. Id. at 807-09; see Jones, 763 A.2d at 1101 ("Melvin represents something of a high-water mark
for the privacy rights of the formerly famous. Nine years later, the Second Circuit reached a quite
different conclusion in Sics .... The analysis of Siis has proven to be much more persuasive than
that of Melvin in modern times.').
81. Sidis, 113 F.2d at 807.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 809.
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Regrettably or not, the misfortunes and frailties of neighbors and "public
figures" are subjects of considerable interest and discussion to the rest of the
population. And when such are the mores of the community, it would be
unwise for a court to bar their expression in the newspapers, books, and
magazines of the day.
85
The holding in Sidis represents a majority rule that is followed with few
exceptions throughout American courtrooms-once public, always public.
86
This rule is especially true when a person is a public figure with respect to a
specific controversy or event and is later involved in public disclosures regarding
that controversy or event.
87
B. The Restatement (Second) of Torts g 6528
Section 652 of the Restatement Second of Torts recognizes four distinct
actions that constitute invasion of privacy, each listed in section 652A and
then explained in subsequent separate sections 652B-652E:
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another (§ 652B); or
(b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness (5 652C); or
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life (§ 652D); or
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the
public (5 652E).8 9
Subsection (c)-the "publicity given to private life" tort-seems
85. Id.
86. See David Libardoni, Note, Prisoners of Fame: How an Expanded Use of Intrusion Upon Pgchologcal
Seclusion Can Protect he Privacy of Former Public Figures, 54 B.C.L. REV. 1455, 1458-59 (2013) (stating that
under the current laws in the United States, there is no way for a former public figure to regain the
privacy rights of private citizens and citing several United States cases as examples).
87. See Partington v. Bugliosi, 56 F.3d 1147, 1152 n.8 (9th Cit. 1995) ("[T]he passage of time
does not alter an individual's status as a limited purpose public figure."); Contemporary Mission, Inc.
v. N.Y. Times Co., 842 F.2d 612, 619-20 (2d Cir. 1988) (discussing how the passage of time does not
mean an individual's status will revert from public back to private), cert. denied sub nom., O'Reilly v. N.Y.
Times Co., 488 U.S. 856 (1988); Street v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 645 F.2d 1227, 1235-36 (6th Cir. 1981)
(concluding a person may retain public figure status regarding a specific event), cert. granted, 454 U.S.
815 (1981), cert. dism'd, 454 U.S. 1095 (1981); Brewer v. Memphis Publ'g Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1256-57
(5th Cir. 1980) (considering whether a public figure removed from the public sphere for many years
could bring an action for defamation under the New York Times standard), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962
(1981); Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 578 F.2d 427, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("The mere lapse of time
is not decisive."), rev'don otbergrounde, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Johnston, 448 F.2d 378, 381-
82 (4th Cir. 1971) (comparing the similarities between defamation and invasion of privacy cases and
the passage of time element used to distinguish between public and private figures).
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
89. Id. § 652A.
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congruent to the right to be forgotten.9° Both recognize individuals' right
to keep to themselves. One apparent difference is that American plaintiffs
alleging a claim based on subsection (c) are seeking monetary damages,
while a claimant in a right-to-be-forgotten jurisdiction, in addition to or
instead of seeking monetary damages, could seek removal of published
personal information.91 Another substantial difference is the seemingly low
amount of privacy protection afforded by this invasion of privacy cause of
action. Section 652D further explains subsection (c):
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter
publicized is of a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
92
The act of "giving publicity" in ection 652D means making information
public.93 To do so, the tortfeasor must go beyond sharing the information
with a small group of persons; the public must be likely to receive the
information.9 4 In the Internet context, anytime a person posts or uploads
information, they are giving that information publicity. However, the
additional requirements of subsections (a)-(b)-the "highly offensive"
requirement and the requirement that the matter be not of legitimate public
concern-severely erode privacy protections for Americans.9" Unless the
disclosed information would be (1) extremely offensive to an objectively
reasonable person, and (2) of virtually no public interest, then the subject
person would have no tort action for publicity of his private life.9 6
C. Instances of Internet Censorship Affecting United States Users
1. Google, Revenge Pornography, and De-linking Web Domains
Several lawsuits and significant media attention surrounding revenge
pornography have facilitated a change to Google's traditional philosophy
that web searches should reflect the web in its entirety." The revenge
90. Id. § 652C.
91. Cf id. § 652D note (discussing the relationship of public and private life to the First
Amendment).
92. Id. § 652D.
93. Id. 652D cmt. a.
94. Id.
95. Id. § 652D cmt. on clause (a), cmt. on clause (b).
96. Id.
97. Amit Singhal, 'Revenge Porn" and Search, GOOGLE PUB. POL'Y BLOG (June 19, 2015),
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pornography epidemic included mostly vindictive postings on the Internet
of nude pictures by an "ex" without the other's consent.98 In response,
Google amended its policies:
Our philosophy has always been that Search should reflect the whole web.
But revenge por images are intensely personal and emotionally damaging,
and serve only to degrade the victims-predominantly women. So going
forward, we'll honor requests from people to remove nude or sexually explicit
images shared without their consent from Google Search results. This is a
narrow and limited policy, similar to how we treat removal requests for other
highly sensitive personal information, such as bank account numbers and
signatures, which may surface in our search results.
99
Google made this calculated decision by weighing the utility of public
access to revenge pornography with the damage suffered by individual
victims of revenge pornography. This change is somewhat indicative of
Google's ability to recognize the intersection of the right to privacy and
freedom of speech and respond correctly. Several other search engines have
amended their policies to adopt similar exceptions.100 However, this policy
implementation only included Google searches and Google images. In most
instances, the original pictures on their respective revenge pornography
websites remained. This fact highlights a significant problem with the
practicality of the right to be forgotten. It is wholly impractical to remove
content from the Internet effectively because of the ease in which content
is duplicated and transferred among users. De-linking specific websites or
images does little to prevent content from reappearing, and content usually
remains in its original location where people can continue to find it by typing
in specific URLs into their browsers. Those specific URLs that have been
de-linked from search engines are often circulated on message boards such
as Reddit and 4chan. A tactic which might produce better results, but would
have an impermissibly chilling effect on the freedom of expression, would
be to de-link Reddit and 4chan-type websites from search engines-





100. GooglePiva1 yPok/y Changes Spark Europe-Wide Inquiy, GUARDIAN (Feb. 29, 2012,11:16 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/mar/ l/google- privacy-po iy-changes-eu.
101. Sam Machkovech, 8ban-hosted Content Disappears from Google Searches, ARS TECHNICA.COM
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2. Erasure Button Laws
Effective as of January 1, 2015, California's Children's Online Privacy
Protection Act ("CalOPPA")'1 2 is the first law of its kind aimed at
protecting minors online.103 One way the law does this is by prohibiting
companies from marketing products to minors that are otherwise prohibited
to be sold or marketed to children offline, such as tobacco and 
alcohol.'0 4
However, the aspect of the law that has caught the public's attention is the
so-called "eraser button," which requires Internet companies to provide a
method by which minors can delete a posted picture from a website."'
0
Websites must provide clear instructions to minors as to how they may
remove content they have posted online, and the website may be required
to make certain content invisible to other website users.'
0 6 Supporters of
CalOPPA and similar legislation argue that such "eraser buttons" can
protect teenagers, which as a demographic are avid users of social 
media'0 7
and whose youthful online posts could come back to haunt them days,
weeks, or even years after they are published online.'
0 8 These proponents
tie the need to be able to remove Internet content posted by an individual
to that individual's maturity, recognizing that teenagers often "self-reveal
before they self-reflect."' 0 9 Enabling teenagers to remove any content they
102. S.B. 568, 2013 Leg., 2013-14 Sess. (Cal. 2013).
103. See Andrea Peterson, Author of California Online Eraser Law: It's Not Always Eay to Find the
Delete Button, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2013/09/25/author-of-california-online-eraser-law-its-not-always-easy-to-find-the-
delete-button/ (explaining the "eraser" provision of the new law which allows minors to delete content
posted by themselves).
104. See id. (observing one aspect of the law is to ensure marketing restrictions that exist outside
the Internet are enforced online as well).
105. Deborah Hastings, Unprecedented Eraser Button'Law in California Gives Teens New Internet iDfe,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 24, 2013, 5:33 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/calif-
measure-kind- teenagers-erase-intemet-article-1.1466400 (describing the law as a tool for minors to
"erase online writings that could become digital skeletons").
106. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22581 (Deering Supp. 2016) (requiring websites to post
clear instructions to minors on how to remove content posted on the website).
107. See Mary Madden et al., Teens, Social Media, and Privag, PEW RES. CTR. 19 (2013),
http://www.lateledipenelope.it/public/52dff
2e35b8 l 2 .pdf (reporting that eight in ten teen Internet
users also use some kind of social media).
108. See Caitlin Dewey, How the 'Right to Be Forgotten' Could Take Over the American Internet, Too,
WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
intersect/wp/2015/08/04/how-the-right-to-be- forgotten-could-take-over-the-american-internet-
too/ (explaining how one high school student's racist tweet became national news and how teens'
social media posts often fall into the hands of college admissions officers and employers years after the
content was put on social media).
109. See Dewey, supra note 108 (relaying position of Jim Steyer, founder and chief executive of
Common Sense Media, regarding privacy for teenagers' social media posts); see also Somini Sengupta,
Sharing, with a Safey Net, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
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regret, or simply do not care to share anymore, means those impulsive over-
sharing or inappropriate posts will stay in the teenage poster's past-
preventing a digital lapse in judgment from haunting them through every
job interview of their adult life.110 Critics of the law see the ability of an
individual to effectively redact their online history as a slippery slope-how
much should an adult be able to retract from Internet posts made as a
teenager? CalOPPA allows for the erasure of content posted by the
individual but not content posted by someone else."' But should a person
also be able to delete content about them that someone has re-shared--or
content about them that was originally posted by someone else?
Other critiques of the law include practicality issues, asserting, for
instance, that "companies [will] be forced to devise multiple policies for the
underage residents of different states" if other states pass laws similar to
CalOPPA." 2 Another argument in opposition to eraser button laws asserts
that the laws, in an attempt to protect minors online, might force website
users to divulge more information to Internet companies, such as their age
and state of residence.'13  Moreover, CalOPPA may face issues with the
Dormant Commerce Clause because it is neither limited to websites based
in California nor used only by people in California. This problem extends
to websites based in other states but available for users in California. 1 4
Other critics think the law does not go far enough. CalOPPA requires that
minors be able to remove content they have posted on the Internet or
request that it be de-linked. However, if that content has already been
shared, it will remain in the "shared" location on the Internet. While the de-
linked websites will not appear in search engine results, the content remains
2013/09/20/technology/bil provides-reset-button-for-youngsters-online-posts.html (quoting Steyer
as arguing that minors do not fully comprehend the effects and consequences of their online posts).
110. See Dewey, supra note 108 (explaining "nearly half of all hiring managers, and a third of all
college admissions officers" consider an applicant's online presence).
111. See id. (discussing the limitation of deletion privileges under CalOPPA, which extend only
to personally posted content, and pointing to the danger of allowing individuals to delete content
posted by someone else); see also Eric Goldman, Cahfornia's New 'Onfine Eraser' Law Should Be Erased,
FORBES (Sept. 24, 2013, 1:35 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/
2013/09/24/califomia-new-online-eraser-law-should-be-erased/#7e8c99f4399d (outlining several
problems relating to CalOPPA).
112. Sengupta, supra note 109.
113. Id.
114. See James Lee, Note, SB 568: Does California's Onine Eraser Button Protect he Privacy of Minors?,
48 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1173, 1177 (2014) (arguing state-by-state regulation of online privacy is
unconstitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause, which prohibits states from enacting laws that
discriminate against or overly burden interstate commerce and arguing in favor of federal laws similar
to Europe's right to be forgotten).
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on the search engine servers and on the website hosting the content.'1 '
IV. CONCLUSION
While Europe's right to be forgotten has opened the floodgates to waves
of requests to search engines for the deletion and de-linking of information,
no such right exists for similar requests in the United States. Proponents of
such a right for U.S. citizens call for laws to protect personal privacy as more
and more data is collected about individuals and hosted online, available to
anyone with the stroke of a Google search.'16 Supporters of the right to
be forgotten in the United States argue that this protection is needed to
reassert a realm of privacy that has drastically shrunk or even disappeared
with the rise of the Internet."' But while the idea of an eraser button seems
like an attractive option for those blurry-eyed and solo-cup-filled photos and
teenage angst-ridden tweets that we would like to prevent from showing up
in a college admission officer's or job recruiter's due diligence, the right to
be forgotten encompasses more than the ability to delete embarrassing
college Facebook posts. The practical application of such a right amounts
to censorship and runs counter to well-established U.S. First Amendment
rights.118 Moreover, as the debate continues as to whether such a right
should exist in U.S. law, lawmakers may find that public opinion disfavors a
right to be forgotten.'19 Instituting the right to be forgotten risks the
suppression of collective memory.'2 ° Although content that is de-linked
from search engine results remains on the actual website on which it is
published, such information is all but useless if it is not accessible through
a search engine.121 Arguing that de-linking is not censorship because the
115. See Sengupta, supra note 109 (noting CalOPPA does not require Internet companies to
completely remove deleted data from their servers or provide a means to delete material that has been
shared by others--"a sensational picture that has gone viral, in other words, can't be purged from the
Internet").
116. See Roberts, supra note 39 (quoting European Commission official Paul Nemitz, who favors
the U.S. following Europe's model of the right to be forgotten).
117. See id. (discussing a debate hosted at the Kaufman Center in New York City between Nemitz
and Professor Eric Posner, supporters of the right to be forgotten, and Digg CEO Andrew McLaughlin
and Professor Johnathan Zittrain, opposing the adoption of such a right in the United States).
118. See general# Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 458 (1980) ("The
limits of law in protecting privacy stem.., from the law's commitment to interests that sometimes
require losses of privacy, such as freedom of expression, interests in research, and the needs of law
enforcement.').
119. See Roberts, supra note 39 ("At the end of the [Kaufman Center] debate, the attendees voted
56% against the notion that the U.S. should adopt a right to be forgotten law.").
120. See id. ('The right to purge Google, in this sense, is no more than a new form of censorship
that provides encouragement o dictators everywhere.').
121. See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SLv. Agencia Espafiola de Protecci6n de Datos (AEPD),
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data is deleted from the search engine but not from the entire Internet is
tantamount to allowing a book to remain on library shelves but redacting all
of the pages. Admittedly, exponentially more personal data is collected and
published on the Internet today than anyone could have imagined even fifty
years ago, and protections are needed to prevent private companies from
invading individuals' reasonable expectations of privacy."' However, our
culture is already taking note of the consequences of living life online, and
the same teens that eraser button laws are being designed to protect are
moving their digital lives to digital platforms that purportedly carry less risk
of creating a permanent Internet embarrassment.12 3  Between 2013 and
2015, the percentage of college admissions officers who reported that social
media had negatively affected a student's admission chances fell from 35%
to 16%.124 Perhaps adults should take a cue from the kids on this one by
taking advantage of the privacy controls offered by social networks and
recognizing that what you post online creates a digital, searchable trail.121
Internet companies continue to evolve their privacy protocols in response
to public sentiment surrounding issues such as cookie tracking and location
based services.126  Meanwhile, our culture continues to accept the
occasional embarrassment of a regrettable social media post from a time
when we did not fully grasp the longevity of these platforms and webpages.
An entire industry is emerging as the private sector sees an opportunity to
help individuals clean up their digital presence and maintain a respectable
online image. 2  The best approach for the United States is to avoid
constitutionality issues with the so-called "right to be forgotten" by
2014 E.C.R. 1-317, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=
152065&doclang=EN (discussing the limits of accessibility of information on the Internet without the
use of search engine results).
122. See Roberts, supra note 39 (reporting Nemitz's comments from the Kaufman Center debate
on how companies like Google and Facebook erode personal privacy by collecting and selling personal
information of their users).
123. See Dewey, supra note 108 ("Everyone knows that if you want to say something racist in this
day and age, you better say it on an anonymous app [such as Whisper and Snapchat].").
124. See id. (relaying the percentage of admissions officers who said a prospective student's
chances of admissions have been hurt by social media has fallen in recent years).
125. See id. (quoting a teen who calls Facebook "parentland" and says teens are beginning to self-
censor their own profiles on the platforms that create more permanent digital trails).
126. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Web Means the End of Forgetling, N.Y. TEVES (July 25, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/magazine/25privacy-t2.html?pagewanted=all (reporting
changes to Google policies to "render all search queries anonymous after nine months" and an
announcement by search engine Cuil that the company will not "keep any personally identifiable
information" of its users, and discussing a technology called Vanish that uses encryption technology
to destroy electronic data after a certain period of time).
127. See id. (discussing companies like ReputationDefender, which monitors the online
reputations of customers in more than 100 countries).
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declining to adopt such a right, and instead allowing public feedback to the
private sector to continue to advance online privacy expectations.
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